High Court Denies Legal Costs to Mother in Housing Dispute

In a significant judgment delivered at the High Court, a mother and her young daughter, who had sought priority status on the social housing list due to allegations of severe domestic violence, have failed in their application to have their legal costs paid by Dublin City Council. The ruling, handed down by Mr Justice Cian Ferriter, brings to a close a complex legal battle that highlighted the intricate and often fraught relationship between desperate housing applicants and local authority protocols.

The case, cited as SM & Anor v Dublin City Council [2026] IEHC 73, centred on a judicial review that was ultimately rendered moot when the applicants were offered social housing. However, the timing and the basis of that offer became the focal point of a contentious dispute over who should bear the financial burden of the legal proceedings. While the applicants secured a home, the court found that this outcome was a result of their natural progression on the housing list rather than a direct consequence of the litigation, leading to a decision of ‘no order as to costs’.

A Desperate Situation: The Background

The proceedings were initiated by a mother and her daughter, referred to as the applicants, who had been languishing on Dublin City Council’s ordinary social housing list since June 2018. Their housing situation was far from ordinary, however. The first applicant, the mother, alleged that both she and her child had been subjected to sustained physical and psychological domestic violence at the hands of her ex-partner. Furthermore, harrowing details emerged regarding the daughter, who had made complaints of sexual abuse against the same individual.

The gravity of their circumstances prompted the mother to seek an expedited route to safety and stability. In 2019, she applied to Dublin City Council under Section 22 of the Housing (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2009. This section of the legislation allows for priority status on the social housing list based on ‘exceptional social grounds’. The application was grounded in the fact that their previous residence had been jointly owned with the alleged abuser, making their housing need critically urgent.

Despite the distressing nature of the application, the Council refused the request for priority status. The struggle continued for years, with the applicants remaining in precarious living situations. In September 2023, as the ex-partner’s behaviour reportedly worsened, the mother applied for priority once again. Once again, the application was refused. A subsequent review of the decision yielded the same result, leaving the family in a state of limbo.

The Legal Challenge Escalates

Matters came to a head in August 2024. On the 2nd of that month, Dublin City Council issued a further decision maintaining its refusal to place the applicant on the priority list. The Council’s reasoning referenced a conversation between the mother and a senior social worker, during which the mother allegedly stated she was not nervous about living in proximity to her ex-partner because an active protection order was in place. This interpretation of the mother’s resilience was contested, but it formed the basis of the Council’s administrative stance.

Faced with continued refusal and a deteriorating situation, the applicants engaged solicitors who acted swiftly. Correspondence was sent to the Council in September and October 2024, urging officials to revisit the decision. On 22 October 2024, a formal pre-action letter was dispatched, signalling the intent to take the matter to court. During this turbulent period, the applicants were provided with short-term emergency accommodation by the domestic violence charity Sonas from 26 September 2024, underscoring the severity of their plight.

With no resolution forthcoming from the local authority, the applicants sought the intervention of the High Court. On 11 November 2024, they were successfully granted leave to bring judicial review proceedings. Their primary legal objective was to quash the Council’s decision of 2 August 2024, thereby forcing a reconsideration of their priority status.

The Housing Offer and the Question of Mootness

The trajectory of the case shifted significantly in December 2024. On the 9th of that month, Dublin City Council wrote to the applicants’ legal team. The letter reiterated the Council’s firm stance that the applicants were not entitled to priority status based on the criteria of the 2009 Act. However, the correspondence contained a crucial development: due to the length of time the applicants had spent on the ordinary waiting list (since 2018), a ‘choice-based letting’ was expected to become available in the mother’s chosen area early in 2025.

The Council proposed adjourning the legal proceedings to facilitate engagement “with a view to resolving the matter”. This proposal sparked a debate over the characterisation of the housing offer. The applicants’ solicitors argued that the accommodation was being offered specifically for the purposes of resolving the high-stakes legal proceedings. The Council vehemently rejected this assertion, insisting that the request for housing was being processed strictly based on the applicants’ position on the ordinary social housing list, independent of the lawsuit.

What followed was a period of frustration and delay. The provision of the promised choice-based letting was stalled by several months due to circumstances the Council claimed were outside its control. This led to the proceedings being adjourned no fewer than 11 times. Finally, on 11 April 2025, the applicant was formally offered housing. By accepting this offer, the core purpose of the judicial review—to secure housing—was achieved, rendering the proceedings ‘moot’.

The Battle for Legal Costs

With the housing issue resolved, the courtroom battle turned to the question of legal costs. In judicial review proceedings, costs can be substantial, and the general rule is that ‘costs follow the event’—meaning the loser pays the winner’s legal fees. However, when a case settles or becomes moot before a final judgment on the substantive issue, determining the ‘winner’ becomes complex.

The applicants applied to the High Court for their costs, arguing that they had, in practical terms, succeeded. They contended that they had sought housing, and housing was eventually provided. They submitted that notwithstanding the Council’s legal characterisation of the offer, the ‘event’ was the provision of a home, which they argued was precipitated by the litigation.

Mr Justice Ferriter, however, was unconvinced by this line of reasoning. In his judgment, he analysed the definition of the ‘event’ for the purposes of Section 169 of the Legal Services Regulation Act 2015. He explained that the event is “inevitably determined by the issues raised and relief sought in the proceedings”. He noted that in her statement of grounds, the applicant was explicitly challenging the Council’s failure to afford her priority status under Section 22(7) of the 2009 Act. The housing she ultimately received was not based on priority status but on her tenure on the ordinary list.

Applying the Principles of Hughes

The Court looked to established jurisprudence, specifically the principles set out in Hughes v Revenue Commissioners [2023] 3 IR 393, to determine liability for costs in moot proceedings. Mr Justice Ferriter accepted that the proceedings became moot due to the Council’s actions (offering the house). Under Hughes, the burden then shifted to the Council to demonstrate that its actions were not undertaken in response to the pressure of the proceedings.

To discharge this onus, the Council relied on an affidavit sworn by a senior official. The official averred that the property had not been offered for the purpose of settling the litigation. Instead, the official stated the property had become available in the ordinary course of the Council’s housing management and was offered to the applicant purely reflective of her place on the social housing list.

Mr Justice Ferriter found that the Court could not “look behind” these sworn averments without evidence to the contrary. He confirmed that this was not a scenario where the Council had conceded the applicant was entitled to priority status, reversing its previous decisions. Nor was there evidence that the applicants had been “bumped up” the list to make the lawsuit go away. The housing offer was consistent with the Council’s long-standing position that the applicant was eligible for housing via the ordinary list, not the priority list.

Interests of Justice and Sympathy for the Applicants

The Court also considered whether the general ‘interests of justice’ required the Council to pay some or all of the applicants’ costs, even if the strict legal test for the ‘event’ had not been met. The applicants’ legal team submitted several factors for consideration. They highlighted that the Council had failed to substantively respond to solicitors’ correspondence in September and October 2024. They also argued that the Council failed to indicate, prior to the launch of proceedings, that the applicants were close to receiving an offer, which might have prevented the lawsuit entirely.

The Council countered that it could not lawfully make representations about the potential availability of property before an applicant’s entitlement arose by virtue of their specific place on the waiting list. To do so would be speculative and potentially unfair to others on the list.

Mr Justice Ferriter expressed sympathy for the view that the proceedings might have been avoided had the Council made internal enquiries about the applicants’ standing on the list immediately upon receipt of the pre-action letter in October 2024. However, he also noted the Council’s contention that the applicant could have checked her own position via the online portal.

Crucially, the judge emphasised that the Court could not embark on a determination of the underlying merits of the priority claim solely to decide costs. The focus had to remain on the procedural reality of why the case became moot.

The Final Ruling

In his concluding remarks, Mr Justice Ferriter was keen to exonerate the applicants and their legal team from any suggestion of impropriety. He stated: “The applicant I should stress seems to me to have acted reasonably in all the circumstances both before and during the proceedings given the desperate situation she regarded herself and her daughter as having been in. Her legal team acted tirelessly, skilfully and appropriately on her behalf. Nothing in this judgment should be taken to detract from that.”

Despite this recognition of the applicants’ reasonable conduct and the skillful advocacy of their solicitors, the legal principles governing costs dictated the outcome. The Council had successfully shown that the housing offer was unrelated to the litigation’s demand for priority status. Consequently, the High Court made no order as to costs.

The ruling serves as a stark reminder of the complexities of administrative law. While the applicants achieved their ultimate goal of a safe home, the financial implications of the legal battle remain unresolved in their favour, highlighting the risks inherent in seeking judicial review against public bodies where the causal link between litigation and outcome is not absolute.